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Some may recall, or have read about, those heady days when history allegedly
ended, as the Berlin Wall collapsed(3). When the wall came down it seemed to
may observers as if, with the end of communism – at least in Europe – the only
threat to existing democratic political power was vanquished. Liberal, plural
democracy, the open society and open organizations seemed to stretch as a
vista into a future full of promise offering peace in our time, with all its assumed
dividends, and the triumph neither of the will nor the state but of decent, ordinary
democracy. Surely the chance to build a better world of organizations was
imminent?
To imagine the end of history is to imagine a world without surprise, contingency
and drama, a world wholly of apparent order. Any social order is an emergent
drama, enacted through the clash of imaginations, encoded through circuits of
power, experienced as different orders of domination. It involves prosaic as
well as implausible projects, dreams as well as nightmares, ambitions as well as
anxieties. Ordering uses whatever devices, actors and technologies come to
hand for it’s constructing. And it always occurs in contested spaces. There is
never a single social imaginary, despite what conservatives, radicals, or
functionalist theorists might think. Always there will be imaginings, striving to
come into being and seeking to deny the strivings of other projects. Such is life.
Not surprisingly, in the 1970s many key debates overwhelmingly concerned
power and the state, in part because in a number of European countries during
this era, notably France, Spain and Italy, it looked as if the communist parties
might gain electoral office(4). Hence, the debates about power at that time were
conceived in terms of the extent to which the state was an organizational
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instrument capable of being run by alternate elites in different ways (Miliband,
1969; Poulantzas, 1973). By the 1980s it was clear that the chance that these
communist parties might have to gain office was past. The neo-liberal agenda
was resurgent, with the pace being set in the UK and the US and other Anglo-
dominions such as Australia and New Zealand. On the left the debates had
shifted to consider how it was possible to construct coalitions and alliances
between disparate and fragmented interests from green parties, feminism, and
from social democrat parties in opposition to these neo-liberal projects. As rates
of unionization declined and the old heartlands of the male blue-collar working
class, such as mining and steel-making, were decimated by the switch to a
post-industrial services economy in most Western countries, the notion of class
position securing clear-cut identities weakened greatly, in both theory and
practice. The debates shifted to encompass the insecurity, multiplicity and
indeterminacy of conceptions of identify in a post modern world (Laclau &
Mouffe, 1985)(5). The proliferation of a plurality of identities introduces many
more points of rupture into contemporary politics. The fundamental role
previously assumed by relations of production in defining identity as either that
of ruling or working class cannot be sustained in the face of new, shifting,
unstable identities. These new identities are articulated not so much through
traditional forms of political representation (parties and unions), but colonized
and channelled through consumption, lifestyles and branding (consumer
generations such as Gen X and Y, Boomers, as well as the new tribalisms of
identity, such as dance, trance, Goths etc).
Increasingly, against the hybridity of identity, the business organizations that
market and brand those identities with which people badge their bodies,
possessions and lives, were becoming increasingly global. Capital became ever
more organized on a transnational basis. Branch offices, dispersed yet
coordinated production and marketing capacities, and spread all over the world,
exploiting global migratory patterns, profiting from globalized labour markets
and consumption (Hardt & Negri, 2000).
The world’s space seemed to be shrinking, not only because of globalization,
in at least three ways. First, time is eclipsed through virtual media. Second,
whereas once there was a limited and secure set of identities planted in firm
hierarchies in the social space, these are now expanding, proliferating, and
complicating the nature of the social space such that it becomes simultaneously
shrunk by over-crowding and much more difficult to navigate because of
increasingly confusing signs. Third, social spaces that once were only colonized
on the colonizers terms are now counter-colonized in ways that threaten the
security of these spaces. The buffering spaces of the social have shrunk.
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SHRINKING SPACE: ECLIPSING TIME
Extending Business Globally
What made contemporary globalization possible, in part, was the virtual
capillaries of instantaneous communication and trade embedded in the Internet.
By the 1990s much of organization theories’ focus had shifted to the emancipatory
possibilities of new virtual technologies potentially rendering hierarchy and
bureaucracy redundant (see Clarke & Clegg, 1998). Optimistically, there is
good reason to think that, however slowly, imperative coordination may be giving
way to responsible autonomy and heterarchy. There are now technologies
available that can handle more distributed authority relations, through the use of
digital and virtual communication. The Internet allows for far less centralized
modes of organization – and, indeed, in the present state of anxiety in society
about terrorist attacks, we are likely to see many organizations adopting more
distributed and network structures, with responsible autonomy in each of their
nodal points – if only to be sure that the organization can survive a cataclysmic
event such as 9/11. It is evident that organizations that have distributed systems
and networked leadership will better survive catastrophe. After all, that is
precisely what the Internet was designed to do(6).
While the optimistic scenarios envisage a world in which small and local
business, offering unique products, will be globally connected by the Internet,
there are more pessimistic aspects of globalization to contend with that are
likely to have an impact on organizational power relations. Pessimistically, the
times in which we live have grown more troubled in many respects and the
necessity of imperative coordination seemingly ever more pressing. As a result
of digital capabilities Western post modern society not only surrounds those
who live within its borders; its global media project images of it to the rest of
the world, intensifying the powers of the market enormously.
Resisting Globally?
In the past the major challenge to market power was the state (Clegg,
Boreham, & Dow, 1983) or the organized labour movement. After the failure
of Eurocommunism in the 1970s, and the rapprochement of social democracy
with the neo-liberal agenda from the 1980s, challenge from the state declined.
The decline in left politics was paralleled in the industrial sphere as well.
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The international organization of capital confronts national labour
movements.
Organized labour has had to match the learning trajectory of that capital in
whose employ it is globally arraigned. Significant global campaigns have emerged
from within the trade union movement and from the critics of globalization to
confront the new global realities (Hogan & Greene, 2002). However, trade
unions remain, for the present, largely nationally institutionalized, and they do
not afford much of a threat to existing organization of the relations of production,
especially as their recruitment and penetration of the post-industrial services
economy is far lower than was the case in the era of industrial labour and
society. Also, they are increasingly irrelevant because their leadership is largely
male and the domain of their traditional membership female. Thus, the biggest
issues that unions face today on the membership front are low female and
ethnic minority participation rates such that the people doing the representing
rarely share either gender or ethnicity.
Inter-union coordination in response to the globalization of value chains was
taken forward by the UK Liverpool dock dispute, which took place between
1995 and 1998. Extensive mobilization of support from within and beyond the
labour movement was achieved through the use of the web in concert with
more traditional forms of mobilization (Carter, Clegg, Hogan, & Kornberger,
2003). Following the defeat of the union, the skills developed in the struggle
have been carried forward to archive the dispute and to develop a sustainable
skill-base within the community(7). Within 48 hours of the settlement of the UK
dispute an identical dispute broke out in Australia, a locus of support for the
Liverpool workers and, at that time, a regulated labour environment (Clegg,
1999)(8). Of critical significance was the role of the Federal Australian
government in planning the dispute, involving overseas training of serving
members of the Australian armed services(9).
Anticipating Resistance? Simulation and Identity in the
Electronic Panopticon
Increasingly, the work force, whether unionized or not, encounters
organizations within which sophisticated surveillance is the norm. Organizations,
not just in government, are increasingly making use of available surveillance
technologies to seek enhanced supervision and control. The electronic
panopticon is going global in an increasingly insecure world, offering
opportunities not only for hypersurveillance but also a new kind of
organizational simulation, that is hyperreal, a world where we can ‘simulate a
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space of control, project an indefinite number of courses of action, train for
each possibility, and react immediately with preprogrammed responses to the
“actual” course of events (which is already over and through a simulacrum)’
(Bogard, 1996, p. 76). Organizations increasingly neither need a political
economy of bodies to handle power nor to embed it in a moral economy of
the soul through extensive surveillance. Instead, they project information in
a mode that has been described as ‘the purest form of anticipation’ (Bogard,
1996, p. 76).
Almost all large scale organizations of any sophistication are increasingly
premised on work whose doing is simultaneously subject to hypersurveillance
of its being done, characteristic of both managerial work and work more
generally. The traces of data that all information-laden actions leave automatically
as they are enacted become the objects for analysis, for the speeding up of
processes, of eradicating porosity through which some effort, time or work
might seep, eradicating the gap between the action and its accounts, the work
and its record, the deed and the sign. The loop between being, doing and
becoming tightens irrevocably on the terms of those elites that can channel and
funnel information, closing down the unaccountable moments in the programmed
loop between employees and technologies reporting data that managers have
to act on.
Hundreds of thousands of workers in both government and private industry
are subjected to drug tests, have their prior work records scanned, are diagnosed
for general health, intelligence, loyalty, family values, economic and
psychological stability (through matches generated in searches of other
databases), fitted to job profiles, placed on career tracks – or unemployment
tracks – all in addition to routine, rigorous monitoring on the job … The virtual
scene of work is one where the end of work – who the worker will have
been, what the worker will have produced, what path his or her career will
have taken – governs the entire process before it begins (Bogard, 1996, p.
117).
It is not only the security apparatuses and the legislative assemblies that
multiply dreams within which identities that are constructs of the profiler, the
psychological tester, and the human resources manager, become crucial. All
large organizations, equipped with the foresight of simulation, can screen out
potential deviance from the organization as easily as the society at large. It is
the reality of how, increasingly, organizations use informatics’ virtual worlds’
as they construct identities within which our lives will be lived. Our identity,
more than ever, will be a social construction, but not necessarily one made
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under conditions of our own choosing. Organizations will increasingly adopt
bio-surveillance technologies, such as retina, fingerprint, and face scanning,
and use this to monitor, restrict and govern access, with all the ethical issues
that entails. Such data, together with those identities that are coded from
market-based information, credit records, credit cards, and other forms of
transactions, will ensure that some elements of identity become less negotiable.
Given the likely direction and speed of development of genetics, organizational
capabilities will increasingly be pre-figurative rather than retrospective; as
Bogard (1996, p. 9) puts it, ‘genetic technology offers the fantastic possibilities
of pre-identification, i.e., identities assigned in advance, profiles that we have
seen can be used to target bodies for all kinds of future interventions and
diversions.’ Potential pathologies for organizations – such as prediction of
earlier than required executive demise due to genetic codes or lifestyle triggers
– can be problems eliminated in advance. Normalization will no longer be
remedial or therapeutic, no longer require the counselling interview as its
major device, but will be anticipatory(10).
Expanding Identities Filling Space
If the previous section has presented a pessimistic view of identity politics,
the technological dystopian view, there is a more optimistic scenario. Much of
the politics that surrounded debates about power in the recent past has centred
on issues of interests and identity. These politics focused on the indetermination
of both interests and identities. However, these debates were only possible in
both a theory and a practice informed by postmodernism (Castells, 1997) in
which a switch occurred from a society that articulated around relations of
productive and domestic labour to one whose centre of gravity was increasingly
relations of consumption. Identities founded in the spheres of work and the
traditional family and household became unsettled, rendering the idea of objective
interests problematic.
In theory, it was postmodernism that deconstructed the stable identities
provided by the great cleavages inherent to the master nineteenth century
narrative of class, which articulated around the relations of production, and the
late twentieth century narrative of feminism, which centred on the relations of
gender. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) made a considerable difference to the
saliency of these debates with their theoretical intervention, analytically
sidestepping all the orthodoxies that wanted to ascribe real interests to others
on the basis of big T theory, whether Marxism, feminism, or whatever.
The theoretical moves were in part a result of reflection on changing realities
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as well as changing priorities. In the political theory sphere, Laclau and Mouffe
could proclaim, as they did, in a Lacanian move, that there was no such thing as
society because there is no transcendent signified subject, what we take to be
reality is a discursive construct. In the sphere of political practice Prime Minister
Thatcher could and did say the same thing, albeit that she meant it in a different
way. For her, as with her close colleague in arms, President Reagan, there
should be only real individuals exercising their freedoms as sovereign consumers.
They were remarkably successful in constructing this as a model of society
that was widely emulated in the West.
One theoretical response to these changing politics was that an excessively
egotistical and narcissistic subjectivity became celebrated as post modern, as a
possibility tied into consumption rather than production. In many respects it
was the material environment that of Reaganomics and Thatcherism that framed
these late eighties debates (Gamble, 1988), as much as debates in post-
structuralism and feminism, although it is evident that they were in fact
interdependent, as left intellectuals struggled to come to terms with the new
neo-liberal conditions of existence.
The debates had effects that trickled into the analysis of organizations, in
terms of a critique of the notion that there are unambiguous identities that possess
real, if unknown, unarticulated, or repressed interests (Clegg, 1989). While the
main thrust of critique was in terms of a stress on the fragmentation, plurality
and ambiguity of identities, the frame of reference was very much that of the
sophisticated employee in organizations in the advanced sectors of the advanced
economies: Immaterial labour producing immaterial goods such as a service, a
cultural or symbolic product (Hardt & Negri, 2000).
Integral to this immateriality is the production of new identities –creative
knowledge workers and symbolic analysts – for whom their work is essentially
tied up with their identity and successful positioning of their identity as a presence
in the competitive market of enterprising subjects. Like workers of old they sell
themselves, their time, but the point of sale occurs through the successful
presentation of their identity as a presence that makes a difference.
Often, these notions of identity are glossed as post-modern, to signify the
fluidity and lack of structural determination by relations of production which is
taken to be a hallmark of modern identities. The modern was seen to be passing
away and the post modern coming to be. Thus, when Frameworks of Power
was written, much as nearly everyone else, Clegg (1989) did not dwell on the
possibility that conceptions of identity, based neither on modern relations of
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production nor post modern relations of consumption, but based instead on
fundamental assumptions about the nature of men, women and their relation to
a transcendent God, would sprout in the midst of modernity(11). We now know
that this was a peculiar blindness(12).
AFTER 9/11: FROM A RISK SOCIETY TO A STATE OF INSECURITY
The Empire Struck Back
For a while, until at least the attack of February 26, 1993 on the World Trade
Centre, it might have seemed as if the old matters of identity were hardly of
any concern. After the second more successful attack of 9/11 few could think
that was still the case(13). Islamic claims to identity were serving as circuit-
breakers to existing power relations.
What emerged from the Middle East was not so much a reassertion of pre-
modern identities but a positioning of a contemporary identity. It is one that
expresses a version of Islam as politically grounded within modern frameworks.
Religious thoughts are used as political weapons, alongside modern instruments
such as the Internet and video, and with a sophisticated grasp of mass media
spectacle. What was evident about what the terrorists who commandeered the
planes did,  was their intersection with, and irruption into, the global circuits of
power that are centered practically, symbolically, and emotionally on New York
and Washington. Practically, New York is the media HQ of the world; the Twin
Towers were the emblem of global capitalism, and the Pentagon the symbol of
American imperial might. If you want the whole world to watch a spectacle
what other venues would be better to stage it in than New York? The choice of
the Pentagon as a target (and the White House, the presumed target of the
fourth plane that was crash-landed in the countryside) made the meaning of the
attack quite transparent. The prime time crews were right on hand at the centre
of global distribution networks. The whole world really could be watching what
was achieved, very quickly. What was innovative about what the terrorists did
was to bring the damage of war to the US mainland in a way that no other
adversary ever had achieved, while simultaneously bringing it to the attention
of the whole world.
9/11 was a carefully choreographed spectacle. Emotionally, the deaths of
thousands of people in a single spectacular were caught in the gaze of the
whole television-viewing world in a re-playable series of instances. As such,
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the spectacular weighed far heavier in the balance than the infinitesimally
numerically weightier accumulation of deaths that have resulted from US Foreign
Policy over the years. Mostly, these were unseen; often they were unreported,
and they were not, on the whole, spectacular. Nor, to put a fine point on it, did
they engage with the emotions of most people in that most self-centred of
nations in which the other identity to that of being American is defined as that
of being an ‘alien’, as US immigration control so nicely puts it.
Of course, that the US has in the past invariably been both politically
discriminate and ethically indiscriminate in its choice of friends and enemies is
no excuse for the awfulness of what happened on 9/11 but it does put it into
some kind of context. Choices involve responsibilities, in foreign relations just
as much as any other. And sometimes others will configure and constitute these
choices in ways that their progenitors could never have imagined in the past, by
disturbing the architecture of politics, meaning, and war utterly. And this seems
to be what has happened. The whole world watched the events of 9/11 in New
York and Washington over and over again in replay; we can conclude that its
designers had a sophisticated grasp of the realpolitik of power and its circuitry.
They knew how to use fear and terror to try and reconfigure the circuitry of
international relations, as well as to destroy lives. With absolutely no resource
dependencies to speak of, with hardly any resources in fact, they were able to
symbolically overwhelm, circuit-break, and reposition the entire architecture of
power that has made the US so comfortable at home, so secure in its projections
of power abroad and so despised by those who regard their causes and peoples
as its victims.
Diaspora, Identity and the Democracy of the Market
The explanation of 9/11 that developed from the bin Laden videos makes it
evident that fundamentalisms were flourishing through which pre-modern
claims to identity were paramount, even as they were promoted in terms of
contemporary politics and media. The claims of and for a religiously fundamental
identity have found realization and ruthless repression alike in different parts of
the Middle East and Muslim Asia(14). Nor did their impact start and stop there.
They also produced resonances amongst the broader Muslim diaspora, of whom
there are over twenty million in Europe alone. For any diasporic community the
central issue is always one of cultural integration, a ‘two-sided process of
immigrants’ adjustment to a new society without loss of what they consider
essential to their identity (or self definition, particularly in the sense of their
religion or ethnicity) and, simultaneously, of the adoptive society’s accommodation
232 RAC, v. 11, n. 3, Jul./Set. 2007
of them (McGown, 1999, p. 43). The notion of difference that is indexed by the
notion of ethnicity is usually thought of in terms of a continuum that stretches
from a primordial, internal concept to one that is external and structural.
Primordially, it is the attachments and relations that one carries with one that
define identity; structurally, it is the boundaries determined by the larger society
rather than the life-world that the communities construct that defines them.
Externally, Isajiw (1979, p. 21-22) defines an ethnic group as an ‘involuntary
group of people who share the same culture or to descendants of such people
who identify themselves and/or are identified by others as belonging to the
same involuntary social group.’ In many developed societies, especially where
the Muslim population is concerned, external and internal definitions coincide.
In the diaspora of British cities, as McGown (1999, p. 228) argues, for specific
ethnic communities, there is developing
a strong consciousness of identity through religion, in order to place themselves in
a new society that is predominantly non-Muslim, and indeed to assert themselves
within it … [a context in which] … the Islamists have acquired a moral leadership
beyond the circle of those willing to identify themselves as such(15).
For some in diasporic Muslim communities generally, the hostility is such that
their identities in question see nothing that resonates positively in the offerings
that the market produces in abundance in the host society. Instead, they see an
overly sexualized, narcissistic and alienating environment. Revolted by what is
on offer in the post modern market – and we in the West are all embraced by
this institution now – for some a retreat to the certainties offered by
fundamentalism seemed desirable. Here, as Durkheim would have expected,
an excess of social integration can lead to a surplus of altruistic suicide as some
people, in some communities, are prepared to kill and die for their beliefs in the
appropriateness of identity(16). A state of insecurity is generating new risks in
and for society.
The State of Insecurity
Beck defined the risk society as one in which the processes of modernization
have introduced systemic risks and insecurities previously unknown in nature
(Beck, 2002, p. 21). The risk society is characterized by decisions that are
industrially produced and potentially ‘politically reflexive’ (Beck, 2002, p. 183).
Beck’s (2002) concern is with industrial production and ecological risk, typified
by phenomena such as Acid Rain, Global Warming, and Chernobyl and with the
loss of identity and heightened insecurity associated with more flexible work
patterns (Beck, 1999).
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Today, Europeans, Americans and Australians live not only in a risk society
but also in a state of insecurity, a condition that previously characterized societies
quite marginal to Western civilization (such as Sri Lanka [George & Clegg,
1997]). If the generalized risk is amplified by floating signifiers that attract fear
and deliver terror in these countries then elsewhere, in countries such as Brazil
and South Africa, that most fundamental element of liberal political philosophy
– the security of the body of the individual subjects and the security of the body
of the polity as a whole – is more at risk from a marginal population, surplus to
employment relations, whose entrepreneurial outlets are largely deployed in a
criminal economy of  drug-dealing, kidnapping, murder, and corruption(17). The
basis of institutionalized and legitimate power relations always rests on a claim
to be able to produce social and moral order – a hypothesis as true of intra-
organizational relations as it is of those that are societal.
‘Society’ and Identity
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the refrain of economic neo-liberalism
was that there was no such thing as society. Society could be conceived of
simply in terms of individuals making economic choices, using price signals as
allocative mechanisms. In the terms of the ‘no society’ project it was postulated
that only individuals should be conceptualized as existentially real. As free
subjects they were able to exercise choices in markets, such that consumption
became the key to identity. An unanticipated side effect of the project is to
whittle down the grounds for identity formation. If you are what you shop to
become then identity formation becomes highly contingent on participation in
the rituals of a market society. Thus, for those who refused the market and its
choices and were estranged politically, economically and ideologically, there
was little or no identity available that could relate to the central projects of the
type of society in which they found themselves(18). For those Muslims with
utopian religious worldviews estranged from the dominant orthodoxies, if what
is on offer is a reality constructed on narcissism, consumerism, and individualism,
then it is not surprising that it should be seen as constituting a hegemon that
affronts their existence, faith, and identity. Where utopian ideals turn present-
day life into a dystopia, it is hardly surprising if some responses are dysfunctional
for the social reality that normalcy constructs. For the poor, it is perhaps more
probable that political utopias, premised on the kind of populism exemplified by
Chavez, will attract attention and support, against the neo-liberal agendas of
the elites and the open economy favored by globalization.
Where utopian ideology exists in communities that barely interact outside the
confines of chosen urban patterns of residence, which, for all the usual reasons
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are highly concentrated, then dystopian beliefs about identity, the world, and
one’s place in it as a member of the broader community, can more easily flourish,
especially where everything that is needed is found there – food, religion,
spouses, culture, and appropriate garb – so there is little need to go outside(19).
Within the embrace of utopianism all faiths develop dystopian groups little involved
in the everyday life of a broader society in which they cannot find themselves,
where disaffected young people are drawn to radical cliques largely devoid of
pluralism, discursively and religiously, because the central role is played by a
literalist interpretation of the key text. In such a situation all interpretive politics
become condensed into one game of hermeneutics in which those interpretations
that seem ‘purest’ will always attract alienated and anomic individuals.
Media and Identity
Finally, as a result of digitalization, individuals have the choice not to be involved
in the cultural life of the place where they live, in the larger sense, but are able
to participate more vividly in the cultural life of the diasporic community through
Al Jazeera and other media, and thus live a reality that, while it is real, is hardly
shared at all with the broader context of everyday life. When this reality is
treated on the BBC, CNN or France2, let alone FoxNews, it is rarely a
personalized but mostly a dehumanized reality – 26 people were blown up in
three suicide attacks in Baghdad on the day that we wrote these words – as
opposed to the continuing focus on the people who were destroyed in the
bombings on one day in London (7/7/2005) or another day in New York (2/11/
2001) or Bali (12/10/02). These others are constituted as our brothers and
sisters. We feel their pain, we know their faces, we read about their families,
and we share their distress and devastation on the nightly news and in the
pages of the newspapers in a way that we do not that when we hear of statistics.
These people are also brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, mothers and
fathers, but their humanity is denied us, because, of these others we know
nothing. They are just a statistic. If we knew better these other people, in
places, places such as Sharm el-Sheikh (07/23/05), if we knew these people
who are not like us, and if, in other places, such as Baghdad (25/07/05) we less
routinely expected the statistics(20), there might be more understanding and a
few more heartfelt tears shed for the losses incurred.
Some young people will be drawn to a dystopian view of reality through a
utopian view of religion. In counties in which their very presence is reflected to
the selves they see in the looking glass of the others through the frame of
difference – different colour, different ethnicity, different language, different
food, different clothes, different lives, and different suburbs – all centred on
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different religion – this will be especially the case. If, in such circumstances,
they might feel their difference existentially should hardly be surprising.
Especially, that is when the difference that you represent seems to be one on
which the other has declared war, via an abstraction of a terror whose sense
signifies attack on ‘people like us’. If, at the same time, the opportunities for
human growth afforded one are rarely posed in terms other than those that are
heavily circumscribed for the deeply devout and orthodox, we should not be
surprised if a few people take seriously both their future perfect utopia and
their present imperfect dystopia(21).
ELITES IN A SHRINKING SPACE AND AN EXPANDING STATE OF
INSECURITY
In the circumstances we have sketched, we don’t expect to see elites
disappearing too quickly. Their circulation might speed up as they fail to deal
with the new threats that the risk society and the heightened state of insecurity
offer, but circulatory elites have always been essential to power(22). Existing
power holders have a bright future in a world where an ideology of threat and
uncertainty pervades the whole social and organizational world as a space of
heightened risk, together with powers of simulation with which to anticipate,
pre-identify and impression manage these risks. The need to organize risk
provides unexpected resources with which to perpetuate social relations of
domination, increasingly legitimated by the new rhetoric of insecurity. Among
these rhetorical resources, the paradoxical power of political powerlessness
plays a crucial role. It shapes a curious social world where leading elites are
both more and more remote from the grassroots and deliver a compelling
discourse about common overwhelming constraints weighing unobtrusively from
the top to the basement of the social strata. Consequently, there is a widening
gap of social hierarchies, an increasingly oligarchic character to political societies,
all oriented to managing overarching threats and constraints upon the whole
social body. And in the midst of that landscape, there is, in parallel, the growing
political apathy of the masses, which tends to privilege individual fates over any
sort of collective good, captured and amplified by popular entertainments such
as Survivor and The Apprentice (Clegg, 2005). Parallel to this is the growing
alienation and estrangement of those people who find fundamental meaning in
literal interpretations of ancient texts, whether Koran, Torah, or Bible. The
Durkheimian ‘nightmare’ of a vanishing solidarity seems to have taken material
form to roam around our lives and worlds.
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The futures of power are indisputably related to the respective influence of
the public and private spheres of action over a large array of political circuits,
including discourses, organizational forms, political regimes, forms of elite
fragmentation and cohesion, as well as the nature of political performance future
leaders will strive for. All are now oriented to a legitimate need to increase
control, tighten power, and restrict access because of the general, non-specific
but existentially real risks posed to organizations by the free-floating signifier of
Terror
Contemporary economic conditions largely shape the futures of power, but
not its understanding. Increasingly concentrated in firms oligarchically, power
as a concept is ‘exploding’ in numerous social meanings, power as a resource
is disseminated and concentrated, while political agendas are dividing into
innocuous local decisions and cardinal centres of power. Agency and sovereignty
are progressively modelled in a rejuvenated combination. Political life is both
founded on claims to establish sovereign centres of power and decision and on
scattered and agonistic agencies, whose mediation demands organization.
That soft power now coexists with enhanced harder power arose in response
to heightened security threats as the influence of remote and unknown people
and collectives increasingly threatened. The most decisive ingredients of political
decisions now come from nowhere, or from globally disseminated bodies, from
hardly delineated competitors, hardly defined networks, hardly graspable claims
arousing in distant places … even from places few have ever heard of previously.
To get the gist of power futures, we must accept the growing dispersion, first, of
systems of meanings and second, of systems of production of meanings among
germane actors. Consequently, one of the most fascinating facets of contemporary
and future systems of power is how these dispersions are organized.
FRAMEWORKS WITH WHICH TO THINK THE FUTURES OF POWER
The importance of the macro-political developments and their likely effect on
the futures of power in organizations is that the futures of power will be largely
dependent on the magnitude of the changes that are affecting and will affect
the organizational world over the next few decades. Whether the agenda for
change will be minimalist, redistributive, developmental or even structuralist, to
take March and Olsen’s four conceptions of the political agenda at the level of
societies (March & Olsen, 1995), the nature and culture of power will be durably
affected.
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Table1: A Framework with which to Think About the Institutional
Futures of Power
Minimalist power is relatively indifferent to substantive outcomes and the
construction of identities; it is more used to minimize the costs of political battles.
Redistributive power is used to limit both inequalities in the polity and the power
of elite. Developmental power is used to generate shared cultures and educate
the people insofar as it constitutes a political community. Structural power is used
in the engineering of specific institutions aiming to shape and control the demands
of the polity (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 242-245).
Power is likely to be increasingly institutionalized in the organizational world as
the futures of power in organizations revolve around two major issues:
. How will organizations preserve and enhance individual freedom and initiative
while relentlessly engineering new managerial institutions that strengthen narrow
circles of powerful individuals monitoring the organization from the top? How
will they combine a structural and a minimalist agenda?
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. How are organizational leaders going to embody the growing societal and political
dimensions of their activity? Put differently, the transformation of leadership
from a set of managerial practices and rules to a set of institutional capacities
implies that we think about power in organizations as a means to educate, socialize
individuals, to create and sustain identities … and to consider the role of elites
as governing institutions instead of merely managing organizations.
To comply with a managerial directive is to accede to a moral or political agenda
that one does not necessarily share. The role of political power is to invent and
engineer powerful institutions that create the necessary obedience-generative
constraints and legitimacies inside organizations and societies. One of the most
pressing questions posed by a perspective based on a political agenda is that of
moral disagreement. The dispersion of individuals and values around the globe in
the present context of global ‘organizational sprawling’ emphasizes the
discrepancies between decisions made in some circles of power and the
perceptions and interpretations of individuals; put another way, the question of
how to manage the common affairs of people who disagree about moral and non-
moral matters but live together in the same society/organization should be stressed.
Resistance, Political Apathy, and Transfers of Power
One can agree with the idea that the traditional elements of the old European
order, resting on kinship, social class, religion, local communities, monarchy (Nisbet,
1993) were scrambled by the forces of democracy. No longer as sharp and clear,
they form an omelette; in some countries the monarchy has been removed from
the mix, in others the church has been separated from the state, and so on. Traditions
live on in some places like a nightmare in the brain of the living, as Marx once put
it. One might think of the noble titles, for instance, which decorate the boards of
business organizations. But they are tangled up in new circuits of celebrity, where
porn stars are indistinguishable from heiresses and heiresses from porn stars,
where celebrity is an end in itself, where people are famous for being famous.
Returning to organizations, the ideological signification of democracy in the
organizational world is not only related to a kind of moral utterance. It is also the
work of power, since democracy in economic institutions is antagonistic to oligarchic
and bureaucratic practices and values. It is power not only in the mechanical
sense of ‘force applied to a people by external government in the pursuit of its
own objectives, but power regarded as arising from the people, transmitted by
libertarian, egalitarian and rationalist ends so that it becomes, in effect, not power
but only the exercise of the people’s own will’ as Nisbet (1993, p. 40) says. The
question arising from this quotation is not merely how far organizations can be
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truly democratic but concerns the peculiar interconnections between democracy,
power and morality. As Nisbet (1993) puts it, power without morality is despotism,
while morality without power is sterile. Scholars must therefore think through the
combination between democracy, power and morality. So far, we have barely
begun to do this in the contemporary practices of organizations.
We think that futures regimes of power will be deeply characterized by their
capacity to build credible combinations between these three elements. This is
why we consider resistance as an outdated topic in the study of power. The
tensions and competition between different combinations of identity are much
more interesting than the never ending description of the always possible or potential
resistance of actors, imagined as if they were puppets waiting the old scripts of
solidarity to animate them, forever cast in their workerist identities Today, the
solidarities are more likely to be ethically nationalistic or religiously fundamental
or both, and the consequences not so much libratory but terrible. If nineteenth
and twentieth century organizations might have had many occasions to fear their
employees qua workers – because of the power of organized labour – the twenty
first century has more to fear from the anonymous terrorist or the barely recognized
ethnic and religious tensions that simmer in their remote branch-plant’s or supply
chain’s hinterland, brought into the organization by those whom they employ or
sub-contract.
The Future of Legitimacy
Many contemporary questions surround the future of legitimacy, but they are
not the classic questions derived from the Marxist cannon of collective
consciousness challenging system legitimation (Habermas, 1976). An example of
the kind of contemporary challenge to legitimacy is given by the massive emotional
gatherings that occurred in France following the death of Pope John Paul II.
While the existing circles of elites (both political and intellectual) were discussing
the legitimacy of flying the national flag at half-mast, thousands of people,
particularly the young, were heading to Paris in especially chartered trains and
coaches. Other gatherings occurred in scattered places in France to share common
meetings, create spontaneous communities, and reflect on the significance of the
event. Whatever one thinks the significance of these events to be, the point is that
on this occasion, the elites had lost control of the people’s wills and preferences.
And that is probably why these elites so harshly and somewhat uselessly focused
their critique on the tricolor and the role of the state in that affair, as something
whose separation seemed questioned by this undisciplining of civil society. A similar
spectacle was observed at the funeral of Princess Diana (see Clegg, 2000). A
240 RAC, v. 11, n. 3, Jul./Set. 2007
further example would be the defeat of the elite-sponsored referendum in favour
of affirming the European constitution that occurred in France on May 27 2005.
The masses did not do as the elites would prefer.
Spectaculars may be the only means capable of mobilizing sufficient energy
and social vibrations to foster collective social dynamics in future. The power of
private emotions in the triggering of contest waves in organizations or in social
and emotional collective action is a long way from the dyadic nature of power
and micro-social approaches to power and obedience. As Satow (1975) has long
suggested, completing the Weberian types of authority might prove more necessary
than ever. If, as we have clearly argued, contestation might arise from unexpected
events, the power of value-rational forms of social action à la Weber is worth
exploring, to shed light on the still absent value-rational forms of leadership. One
of the missing links between the ethical and environmental realms of legitimization
and the subsequent potential transformation of political structures resides in the
absence of a coherent model of leadership. Following Willer (1967), a value-
based model of leadership would be founded on ‘faith in the absolute value of a
rationalized set of norms’ (1967, p. 235). Obedience (of the governors as well as
the governed) may be due to an ideology proffering legitimacy such that those in
dominant relations of power derive their mandate directly from their exemplary
relationship to the goals of that ideology.
Value-based leaders are expected to take decisions, regardless of the
consequences of these decisions on the organization, from the moment when the
decisions are ‘aligned’ with the goals of the ideology(23). Unless we accept the
hypothesis of the emergence of global corporate elites, taking decisions in remote
circles of power, defending first and foremost the interests of the global corporate
village, regardless of the consequences of these decisions on more parochial
aspects and sub-leaders, this seems less the case in business organizations. An
uncertain political regime, defending otherworldly objectives, but monitoring
simultaneously the necessary adaptations of the concrete organizations in order
to survive, would emerge where such events occur(24).
CONCLUSION
Realists, unlike utopians who expect reward in the hereafter, while they
may still bank on the future, always hedge their bets in the here-and-now by
pursuing the most reliable means to ensure whatever bliss is desired,
accomplished through social relations that deliver power, wealth, and any
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conceivable pleasure that a healthy body and mind might enjoy, in a society
where virtually everything is for sale at a price. And for that which cannot be
bought directly, such as security from those others whom one offends by
one’s existence, then sufficient isolation, distance and space can be bought
that serves as a practical surrogate. Welcome to the modern, gated,
hyersurveilled world of power’s outer limits.
Classical theorists such as Weber regarded organizations as having a
rationalizing mission, best seen as condensed in the responsibilities of the
state for the rules of the overall organization game. He would have thought
that corporate leaders should be concerned to reduce poverty and
discrimination within their own organizations in order to be legitimate enough
to demand the same outside their organizational borders, as a part of this
rationalization. If corporate leaders failed in such rationalization then we would
expect that, while no doubt corporations might be better places if they were
to be democratic, democracy is not necessary to enhance profitable
interactions with the rest of society. Thus, they can hardly be expected to
shift out of necessity, but only out of the courage and insistence of various
forms of leadership in these organizations and their societies more generally.
In other terms, organizations can’t be expected to play an active ‘governmental’
role in specific countries without leadership, and the poverty and inequalities
embedded in existing hierarchies are unlikely to be reduced by those
organizations they serve. But, in the neo-liberal world, it is hardly likely that
governments will address these issues systematically instead.
Increasingly the neo-liberal governmental agenda is being delivered by the private
sector, acting either alone or through public-private partnerships. Corporate and
not-for-profit organizations are now expanding their powers and capacities to
occupy the role previously played by the state, which has now become, if not
merely a night watchman, an increasingly alert security apparatus with many
watchful eyes on those borders threatening its own conceptions of civility. In this
scenario, especially as borders are breached by aliens or where, like cuckoos in
the nest, aliens have bred within their confines, the old notions of the citizenship
state (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992) will be overtaken. In their stead develops a
notion of the state as facilitator and underwriter of markets, with varying consumer
rights of access, increasingly minimized by exclusion of those considered
inadmissible as citizens, mediated by location in the hierarchies of employing
organizations. But once again, with power issues in mind, new forms of resistance
and activism might arise out the ashes of local communities and corporate sub-
groups, around the emergence of new forms of domination – based on non-
economic fundamentalisms – with their attendant ‘truths’.
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The classical sociologists were all big picture theorists. As such, they would agree
that scholars should never forget that, related to any new social agenda, there will
be new discourses of truth. These discourses might obscure the power dynamics
actually shaping the political forms and structures that govern organizations and
delimit possible forms of social relations. The classical theorists eschewed the notions
of truth as a static entity but saw it as something emergent, contingent, a social fact,
a configuration, a social action, something over which battles are fought. Unexpected
battles will surely shape the futures of power, and the futures of knowledge. We
cannot avoid power relations – and it would be dangerously utopian to assume that
we can – but we can exercise freedom in choosing, resisting, rejecting, undermining,
accepting, imposing, extending, beguiling, and questioning power. Power is an
irreducible element of any imaginable form of life.
NOTES
1
 The argument of this paper draws from the last chapter of the book, Power and Organizations, by
Clegg, S. R., Courpasson, D., & Phlllips, N. (2006). Power and Organizations. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
2
 Stewart Clegg also holds a Professorship at Aston Business School, The University of Aston, UK,
as well as joint appointments as a Visiting Professor and International Fellow in Discourse and
Management Theory, Centre of Comparative Social Studies, Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam,
Netherlands, Visiting Professor of Organizational Change Management, Maastricht University,
Faculty of Business, Netherlands and Adjunct Profess EM Lyon, France.
3
 The end of history was a thesis advanced by Frances Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and
the last man. London: Hamish Hamilton. who saw the demise of the Soviet Union as the ultimate
triumph of liberal democracy which, having vanquished fascism, had now done the same for
communism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire, he suggested, the
future looked assured and safe for market economies. The thesis was subject to criticism by
Huntington (1997). who foresaw a clash of civilizations as the future, rather than a benign global
economy. It was a thesis that secured some celebrity after 9/11. The account he proposed was
equally flawed but for different reasons: He lumped together as singular civilizational blocs societies
and beliefs that were far more fissiparous and contested than he allowed. Moreover, Huntington
failed to acknowledge the extent to which the ‘clashes’ in the twentieth century were largely shaped
by the rivalry between the respective US and Soviet empires, and their support for whatever
corrupt regime, wherever their administration’s sense of national interest determined it, that sufficed
to guarantee what they defined as their interests. These interests were overwhelmingly strategic, as
defined by economic, security and cultural imperatives. The clash of civilizations, in other words,
was played out through the mirror of respective imperial interests. Clearly, the demise of the Soviet
Union leaves the US as the sole shaper of these global relations – relations within whose context all
other inter-organization relations need to be viewed. The start to such an endeavor would be
through comparative institutional analysis of local, national elites, their formation and orientations.
Such an endeavor has yet to be systematically undertaken.
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4
 Eurocommunism (Carrillo, S. (1977). Eurocommunism and the state. London: Lawrence and
Wishart) was initiated by the leading Western European communist parties as an electoral project
in the 1970s designed to try and attain office through the ballot box, by forming alliances with a
broader constituency, including the new middle class – seen through the lens of proletarianization
and deskilling – and green and feminist issues and concerns. It failed both to differentiate itself
sufficiently from what the social democrat parties were doing and to signal clearly how it differed
from what the Soviet empire had to offer.
5
 We adopt the following convention: post modern refers to the idea that there might be empirical
tendencies in the world that are ‘post’ in the sense of being after modernity and not necessarily a
constitutive part of it. Where we use the compound form, postmodern, we refer to the idea that
there might be such things as postmodernism or postmodern theories.
6
 By the end of the twentieth century the Internet had enabled the vertically integrated multinational
corporation, under unified ownership, to be replaced by networks of externalized relationships
between associated but often autonomous firms. This wider separation of networks which link
locations in East Asia with the U.S. and Europe is typified by the operations of electronics
companies such as Texas Instruments which distributes research and development between Austin
Texas and Taipei. Smooth operation relies upon a synchronized corporate database physically
replicated on identical hardware at each end of the link using a high-capacity data link. The notion
of ‘networked enterprise’ promoted by Castells, M. (1996). The information age: economy, society
and culture. Oxford: Blackwell. as a means of geographically and temporally constrained
collabouration in order to enter and shape specific market has, however, already been superseded
by more durable modes of operation. Companies such as ARM Holdings (http://www.arm.com/)
produce high value intellectual property utilized by global corporations that rely, in turn, upon
third party manufacturing facilities such as those provided by Flextronics (http://
www.flextronics.com/). The actors located at each node of the network have a range of geographical
locations available to them across which to distribute intellectual property and physical processes:
the furthest development of ICT dependent re-configuration. Computerization within commercial
and administrative organizations initially represented an extension of earlier office technologies
designed to address internal efficiency. As the potential of computers to manage supply chain and
customer relationships became apparent, organizational effectiveness became a primary objective.
Finally, as the innovations in business models and inter-firm relationships permitted by the synergies
of networking became apparent, inter-organizational management of the production and value chain
became the focus of both local and global systems. There is, however, some suggestion that the
rhetoric attached to these network tendencies exceeds their actual accomplishment; see, for instance
DiMaggio, P. (2001) The 21st Century Firm: Changing Economic Organisation in International
Perspective. Princeton New Jersey, Princeton: University Press. and Pettigrew, A. M, Whittington,
R., Melin L., Sanchez-Runde, C.,   Bosch, F .A .J., van den , Ruigrok, W. & Numagami, T. (2002)
Innovative forms of organizing: international perspectives, London: Sage..
7
 See http://www.mmm.merseyside.org/cd.htm and http://www.mmm.merseyside.org/project.htm
8
 The second dispute is archived at http://mua.org.au/war/ and is discussed in Clegg (1999).
9
 See http://mua.org.au/war/cloak.html http://www.ilwu12com/global/wharfie/update65.htm.
10
 In the movie Gattaca (Nicoll, A. (Writer). (1997). Gattaca. USA: Sony), the main character,
Vincent, notes, ironically in the context of the corporate organization Gattaca that ‘We now have
discrimination down to a science’. It is a science that attempts to ensure that one is what one is
coded as being irrespective of what or who one might want to be recognized as being or becoming.
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The movie demonstrates that resistance is possible, insofar, as its tagline has it, ‘There is no
Gene for the Human Spirit’. In the film, human endeavour is exemplified by a self-disciplined
subject who overcomes the fact of being someone with invalid genes, and aspires to and achieves,
what he desires, in a journey that is plotted quite consciously as one of redemption through
resistance.
11 We make no distinction between fundamentalisms in this regard. In the US abortionists have been
shot as well as a government building, and the people in it, blown up by a truck bomb. Such actions,
sociologically, have to be thought through the same terms as those other fundamentalisms that
receive more attention in the present conjuncture.
12
 It was not just an academic error. The bitter harvest of 9/11 was in large part, if not sown, then
at least nourished and fertilized by political decisions made by successive US administrations,
notably the Carter-Brzezinski administration in office at the time that the US first provided aid and
advice to the anti-Soviet opposition in Afghanistan in mid-1979, before the Soviet invasion. The
immediate end of miring the Soviet Union in its own Vietnam was certainly achieved; however, one
cannot think that the outcome of training, supporting and empowering jihadists who would later
turn on their erstwhile sponsors, was a desired outcome. (On these matters it is instructive to read
Tariq Ali, T. (2002). The clash of fundamentalisms: crusades, jihads and modernity. London: Verso.
The Clash of Fundamentalisms.) There is an analytic point to this small piece of tragic history. One
reason why the episodic approach to power is flawed is because to focus on the episode often
means not attending to the unanticipated consequences of the social actions that were initiated in
the episode in question.
13
 While the World Trade Center attack of 9/11 seared itself into the global consciousness, a
previous terrorist attack by US citizens, on US citizens, should have been sufficient to raise the
possibility that some identities, in that country rather than from outside it, were being shaped in
fundamentally different ways to the norms of overall social formation. It was a different kind of
fundamentalism, rooted in anti-statism and the defense of a notion of liberty, nourished by fervent
religiosity, that lay behind an earlier terrorist attack on US soil – the April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing, itself allegedly related to the events that occurred in Waco, Texas, on April 19, 1993,
when, after 51 days of a blockade of the Branch Davinians compound by Federal Government
agents from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), supported by the
US Army, the blockade culminated in the death of 74 people, including many children. The
interpretation of the events that led up to and occurred on each of these April 19ths remains highly
contested. The analytical point is one of sociological agnosticism: it is not just one kind of
fundamentalism that can lead to disastrous consequences.
14
 It should be clear that the claims made by Islamist fundamentalists are just one of many political
positions that find expression within Muslim belief systems. These politics are as complex and
deep as politics anywhere usually are; again, Tariq Ali (2002) is an excellent guide.
15
 McGown (1999) is writing, specifically about Somalis in London, whom she contrasts with the
community in Toronto, where a more formal multiculturalism leads to different outcomes: ‘it is in
large part the political culture of the adoptive society that will determine the quality of the connection
between Western Muslims and their non-Muslim compatriots’ (McGown, 1999, p. 231). Adding
credence to this important point is research by Ghorashi, H. (2004). How dual is transnational
identity? A debate about dual positioning of diaspora organizations. Culture and Organization,
10(4), 329–340. which looked at the identities of Iranians in Orange County, California, after 9/11.
Ghorashi finds a situation that seems closer to that of Somalis in Ottawa than London: instead of
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a binary bilateral positioning she finds instead a far more multi-layered, multi-connected sense of
identity being constructed in which the terms are hybrid rather than binary. Her data is drawn from
people mobilizing through  a Network of Iranian-American Professionals in Orange County (NIPOC),
establishing an identity that is neither binary nor between cultures but which draws on plural and
fragmented experiences, coded in terms of more than just signifiers of religion or ethnicity, although
drawing on common experience. A new imaginary which rethinks ways of being American is
invoked and, after the crisis of 9/11, reinstated as a form of identity positioning in which the major
difference is not established between the adoptive home and that left behind, but between the
adoptive identity and those other identities that are being inscribed – and stand a risk of being
ascribed – which are premised on the dominant host societies reading of Islamic otherness. NIPOC
as a form of ethnic network organization becomes a valuable resource in countering such ascription
and maintaining a claim to difference from the identities being ascribed. Given the cultural hybridity
of all major cities in modern nations, the real claims to pre-modern identity are those, from either
side of the imagined binary, which assume identity simply ‘is’ or is ‘not’. It is the denial of
hybridity that is pre-modern.
16
 In the latter case one is dealing with the phenomenon of suicide bombing, which has spread
from its development by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to be widely used as in violent, politically
motivated attacks, carried out in a deliberate state of awareness by someone willing to blow
themselves up in pursuit of what they define as a greater good. In Weberian terms, suicide
bombers and those organizations that support them are practicing a blend of value and
instrumental rationality. There is an underlying value ethic, which, in the case of Islamic
fundamentalisms, has a religious basis, but there is also an instrumental purpose. Suicide
bombing is a low cost strategy for achieving high impact results, due to their ‘spectacular’
dimension, which ensures that the images and accounts are obsessively retailed in the media to
such an extent that they sear themselves into the consciousness and attitudes of those people
who are affected in their everyday life, reflected in polls, reflected in pressure on national
politicians. In this sense the strategy is a rational and strategic choice, at least in territorial
politics such as those of Palestine: when applied in the context of territorial struggles it can
position those organizations that sponsor it as potential players in more conventional politics,
once their dominance has been asserted through the strategy. However, in locations such as
western cities, where territory is not the issue, but the perceived wrongs being done to a faith-
based community, then the politics are more gestural and theatrical, more a spectacle, in an
echo of what Kropotkin, P. (1898). Anarchism: its philosophy and ideal. San Francisco: Free
Society. once advocated as the propaganda of the deed.
17
 Irrespective of one’s views of the legitimacy, or otherwise, of the US-led Coalition in its occupation
of Iraq, it is in that poor benighted country that the political insecurity of the body corporeal and
politic seems presently to be most severe. For a balanced view of the human rights excesses on all
sides the reader may wish to consult the Amnesty International report on Iraq. It can be accesses at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iraq/document.do?id=ar&yr=2005.
18
 The positive aspects of multiculturalism would hardly do as a basis for identity formation where
these were strongly contested by significant strata in the host society, such as the various white
supremacists parties and defenders of the faith of the old ways of being before colonial citizens
migrated to the ‘Mother country’. The affirmative version of multiculturalism, a positive and
inclusive project, and its critique, were routinely hijacked by politicians for their own ends.
19
 Hence there is both too much social integration of such youth in community and urban space and
insufficient integration with the broader embedment of ‘British’, ‘American’, ‘French’ or whatever
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society (see Durkheim, E. (2002). Suicide: a study in sociology (John A. Spaulding & George
Simpson, Trans., Introduction George Simpson). London: Routledge.. for the basic concepts of
social integration).
20
 From the International Herald Tribune (http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/25/news/iraq.php)
of Monday July 25, 2005: ‘A suicide truck bomb rammed into barricades at a police station here in
the middle of a raging sandstorm on Sunday, killing at least 25 people and wounding at least 33
others, Iraqi officials said. The American military said at least 40 people died.’ No names, no human
interest, in effect, no human beings – just statistics.
21
 Understanding why something might happen is not equivalent to condoning it, nor is it evident
that this understanding necessarily translates into appropriate action. When the causes of a
phenomena – contemporary Islamist terrorism – are so deeply rooted in the dysfunctions of
specific societies in the Muslim world, the history of their relations with the Christian world, and
of both with the Jewish world, as well as the condensation of all these relations in the internal
politics of Islamic belief systems, it should be evident that a problem so complex will hardly admit
of a simple answer, or be amenable to just one type of pressure applied liberally through force of
arms intended, unsuccessfully, to shock and awe. On no side does the rhetoric suggest that a great
deal of rational understanding of the Other is in evidence. In fact, it appears to be a situation where
the rhetorical points of reference are so immanent to their own systems of meaning and consequently
so far apart, that any rational dialogue is precluded. Those of us concerned about the security of the
body – both corporeal and political – have little reason not to be anxious. The state of insecurity
stretches out ahead of us as far as the mind can envision. Its organizational implications are not
incidental, given existing tendencies to hyper-surveillance.
22
 The Spanish general election of 2005 might be seen as a case in point
23
 The decision to invade Iraq by the US and Coalition forces as a part of the ‘War on Terror’ would
seem to be a case in point.
24
 This idea is close to the notion of ‘formal ideological group’ developed by Nahirny, V. C. (1962).
Some observations on ideological groups. American Journal of Sociology, 67(4), 397–405. for
groups committed both to the maintenance of organizational structure and ideology.
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